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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
SHANE HOCHSTETTER, : Case No. 890537 CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Eyewitness identification was a central issue in 
appellant's case. Consequently, appellant was entitled to a 
cautionary instruction on that issue. Because the evidence 
corroborating the eyewitness identification was of questionable 
credibility, it was prejudicial to fail to give the eyewitness 
identification instruction. 
ARGUMENT 
Respondent claims that appellant's conviction should be 
affirmed because appellant has failed to show that he was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel. Respondent relies 
essentially on a two part argument: First, identification was 
not a central issue in the case, consequently the cautionary 
instruction from State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Ut. 1986) is not 
required. Second, appellant has failed to demonstrate prejudice. 
In Long, the requirements that the court placed on a 
defendant to warrant a cautionary instruction on eyewitness 
identification were that identification be a central issue in the 
case and that the instruction be properly requested. In this 
case, identification was the central, if not primary, issue on 
the robbery charge. The cross examination of the eyewitness 
involved purely identification issues. The witness was examined 
about a prior description of the robber. (Tr. 61) The lighting 
conditions were questioned (Tr. 61-63) as were prior descriptions 
by the eyewitness of the other two people involved in the 
robbery. (Tr. 63) There were also questions about the 
description of the weapon held by the assailant. (Tr. 65-66) 
The defense called a witness, John Cribbs, a police officer who 
took a statement from the eyewitnesses that involved a 
description of the robber that was inconsistent with the 
defendant's physical appearance. (Tr. 120-7) Finally, in 
closing argument defense counsel discussed some of the problems 
with the eyewitness identification. (Tr. 169-171) Respondent 
claims that the amount of corroboration reduced the importance of 
the identification issue. The record demonstrates otherwise. 
Eyewitness identification was the central issue in appellant's 
trial. 
Respondent argues that before ineffective assistance of 
counsel may be shown with respect to the failure to request a 
jury instruction, the evidence in support of that instruction 
must be compelling. In support of that proposition, respondent 
cites Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Ut. 1983). That 
statement is taken from one sentence of dicta where the court is 
speculating about what it may consider sufficient to sustain a 
showing of ineffective assistance of counsel. That position is 
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inconsistent with the ruling of this court in State v, Moritzsky, 
771 P.2d 688 (Ut. App. 1989). To determine if there was a 
deficient performance in that case, the court first required a 
showing that the defendant was entitled to the instruction. The 
only other requirement in Moritzsky was a showing that there was 
no tactical advantage in failing to request the instruction. As 
was discussed in appellant's opening brief, and as shown above, 
there was no tactical advantage in not requesting the instruction 
on eyewitness identification. 
Respondent also contends that, because there was no 
claim of suggestive procedures in obtaining the identification of 
the defendant, the cautionary instruction is not warranted. 
Under the standard established in Long, there need not be a claim 
that identification procedures were suggestive to entitle a 
defendant to the cautionary instruction. As previously 
discussed, Long only requires that a request for the instruction 
be made and that identification be a central issue in the case. 
Furthermore, a major part of the instruction at issue does not 
deal with suggestive procedures. Rather, the instruction 
addresses the problems in any eyewitness identification. The 
respondent's claim that a lack of suggestive identification 
procedures should preclude giving of the instruction is without 
merit. 
Respondent next contends that there is sufficient 
corroboration to alleviate any prejudice from the failure to give 
the cautionary instruction in this case. In appellant's opening 
brief, the problems with the credibility of the corroborative 
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evidence are discussed at length* These problems exist, not 
because of conflicts with appellant's testimony, but rather 
because of the lack of foundation for the handwriting opinion and 
the internal inconsistencies in the testimony of the witnesses 
who related appellant's purported admissions. 
Respondent's final point argues that the ineffective 
counsel claim based on the failure to give a jury instruction 
relates only to the aggravated robbery charge. Appellant must 
concede it would be difficult to classify the identification 
evidence a "central issue" on the credit card charge. However, 
the eyewitness identification evidence tended to corroborate the 
handwriting opinion evidence. It was therefore at issue on the 
second charge. Appellant maintains that the convictions for both 
offenses should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant was denied his constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel. The judgment and conviction 
rendered below should be reversed and a new trial ordered. 
DATED this day of February, 1990. 
G. FRED METOS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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